Optimal incentive contracts under loss aversion and inequity aversion
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Publication:2272425
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Cites work
- A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
- An uncertain contract model for rural migrant worker's employment problems
- Bargaining and inequity aversion: on the efficiency of the double auction
- Consumption paths under prospect utility in an optimal growth model
- Dynamic Pricing Strategies with Reference Effects
- Impacts of risk attitude and outside option on compensation contracts under different information structures
- Optimal consumption with reference-dependent preferences in on-the-job search and savings
- Optimal incentive contracts under inequity aversion
- Optimal incentive contracts under relative income concerns
- Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
- The first-order approach to the principal-agent problems under inequality aversion
- Theory of games and economic behavior.
- Uncertain agency models with multi-dimensional incomplete information based on confidence level
- Uncertainty theory
Cited in
(10)- Intertemporal incentives under loss aversion
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5260276 (Why is no real title available?)
- Inequity-averse agents' deserved concerns under the linear contract: a social network setting
- Optimal incentive contracts under inequity aversion
- Impact of cost uncertainty on supply chain competition under different confidence levels
- Task assignment under agent loss aversion
- Equity-based incentive to coordinate shareholder-manager interests under information asymmetry
- Gain versus loss contracts: does contract framing affect agents' reciprocity?
- On the study of a single-period principal-agent model with taxation
- Deadline-based incentive contracts in project management with cost salience
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