Optimal incentive contracts under loss aversion and inequity aversion

DOI10.1007/S10700-018-9288-1zbMATH Open1425.91258OpenAlexW2792733286WikidataQ130189966 ScholiaQ130189966MaRDI QIDQ2272425FDOQ2272425

Authors: Chi Zhou, Jin Peng, Zhibing Liu, Binwei Dong 

Publication date: 10 September 2019

Published in: Fuzzy Optimization and Decision Making (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10700-018-9288-1

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zbMATH Keywords

subdifferentialloss aversionuncertainty theorymoral hazardinequity aversioncontract theory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cites Work

• Theory of games and economic behavior.
• Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
• A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
• Uncertainty theory
• Optimal incentive contracts under inequity aversion
• Dynamic Pricing Strategies with Reference Effects
• Consumption paths under prospect utility in an optimal growth model
• Bargaining and inequity aversion: on the efficiency of the double auction
• Optimal incentive contracts under relative income concerns
• The first-order approach to the principal-agent problems under inequality aversion
• Impacts of risk attitude and outside option on compensation contracts under different information structures
• An uncertain contract model for rural migrant worker's employment problems
• Uncertain agency models with multi-dimensional incomplete information based on confidence level
• Optimal consumption with reference-dependent preferences in on-the-job search and savings

Cited In (6)

• Optimal incentive contracts under inequity aversion
• Impact of cost uncertainty on supply chain competition under different confidence levels
• Equity-based incentive to coordinate shareholder-manager interests under information asymmetry
• Gain versus loss contracts: does contract framing affect agents' reciprocity?
• Deadline-based incentive contracts in project management with cost salience
• Title not available (Why is that?)

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