Bargaining and inequity aversion: on the efficiency of the double auction

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2011.09.027zbMATH Open1242.91087OpenAlexW2094681953MaRDI QIDQ435782FDOQ435782

Authors: Alexander Rasch, Achim Wambach, Kristina Wiener 

Publication date: 12 July 2012

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2011.09.027

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zbMATH Keywords

bargainingmechanism designinequity aversiondouble auctiontwo-sided asymmetric information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
• Optimal incentive contracts under inequity aversion
• Bargaining under Incomplete Information
• Optimal Auction Design
• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• Bargaining solutions with non-standard objectives

Cited In (12)

• Two-sided unobservable investment, bargaining, and efficiency
• Rationing, bargaining, and voting in 2-sided markets
• Incomplete information about social preferences explains equal division and delay in bargaining
• Equilibrium in the two-player, \(k\)-double auction with affiliated private values
• Optimal incentive contracts under loss aversion and inequity aversion
• INEQUALITY AVERSION CAUSES EQUAL OR UNEQUAL DIVISION IN ALTERNATING‐OFFER BARGAINING
• Fairness and inefficient divorce
• Efficiency and Voluntary Implementation in Markets with Repeated Pairwise Bargaining
• Efficiency and compromise: a bid-offer-counteroffer mechanism with two players
• Modularity and greed in double auctions
• Spite and reciprocity in auctions
• Strategic bargaining and full efficiency

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