Incomplete information about social preferences explains equal division and delay in bargaining
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Publication:2345026
DOI10.3390/g3030119zbMath1311.91117OpenAlexW2149565975MaRDI QIDQ2345026
Publication date: 19 May 2015
Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g3030119
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)
Related Items (2)
INEQUALITY AVERSION CAUSES EQUAL OR UNEQUAL DIVISION IN ALTERNATING‐OFFER BARGAINING ⋮ Hierarchical Bayesian analysis of biased beliefs and distributional other-regarding preferences
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