Sequential bargaining under asymmetric information

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(86)90023-2zbMath0616.90107OpenAlexW3123336481WikidataQ29030945 ScholiaQ29030945MaRDI QIDQ1821709

Sanford J. Grossman, Motty Perry

Publication date: 1986

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/t0056.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

backward inductionperfect sequential equilibriuminfinite stage, alternating offer bargaining game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items

A non-cooperative bargaining theory with incomplete information: verifiable types, A note on repeated-offers bargaining with one-sided incomplete information, Support restrictions and sequential equilibria, Endogeneity of alternating offers in a bargaining game, On the existence of monotone pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium in games with complementarities, Bargaining over incentive contracts, Only time will tell: credible dynamic signaling, Simultaneous offers and the inefficiency of bargaining: A two-period example, A direct mechanism characterization of sequential bargaining with one- sided incomplete information, Communication in bargaining over decision rights, Fixed-equilibrium rationalizability in signaling games, Optimal pricing against a simple learning rule, Dynamic bargaining with action-dependent valuations, Information collection in bargaining, A war of attrition with endogenous effort levels, Optimal debt contracts under costly enforcement, Reserve price signaling, Bargaining with common values, Perfect sequential equilibrium, Auctions in the post-change-order period, Incomplete information about social preferences explains equal division and delay in bargaining, The game of negotiations: Ordering issues and implementing agreements

Cites Work

• Foundations of dynamic monopoly and the Coase conjecture
• Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
• Perfect sequential equilibrium
• Bargaining with Incomplete Information: An Infinite-Horizon Model with Two-Sided Uncertainty
• A Multistage Model of Bargaining
• Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal
• A Bargaining Model with Incomplete Information About Time Preferences
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Sequential Equilibria