Fixed-equilibrium rationalizability in signaling games

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(90)90035-IzbMath0738.90092OpenAlexW2062008880MaRDI QIDQ1173868

Iñigo Zapater, Lars Stole, Joel Sobel

Publication date: 25 June 1992

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(90)90035-i

zbMATH Keywords

signaling gamesequilibrium refinements

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items

On rationalizability in extensive games ⋮ Signaling Games ⋮ Payoff information and learning in signaling games ⋮ On non-monotonic strategic reasoning ⋮ Stable matching under forward‐induction reasoning ⋮ Rationalizability and epistemic priority orderings ⋮ RATIONALIZATION IN SIGNALING GAMES: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS ⋮ Contractual signaling in a market environment ⋮ Strong belief and forward induction reasoning.

Cites Work

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