Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
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Publication:3754461
DOI10.2307/1913604zbMATH Open0617.90105OpenAlexW2119040993MaRDI QIDQ3754461FDOQ3754461
Authors: Jeffrey S. Banks, Joel Sobel 
Publication date: 1987
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160524-120531056
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- Some dynamics of signaling games
- A dynamic model of equilibrium selection in signaling markets
- Sequential equilibria in signaling games
- Sequential equilibria in signaling games
- Separating equilibrium in quasi-linear signaling games
- Strategic stability of equilibria in multi-sender signaling games
- Comparative statics of a signaling game: An experimental study
Cited In (only showing first 100 items - show all)
- Two-person bargaining behavior in fixed discounting factors games with infinite horizon
- Refining cheap-talk equilibria
- Partially informative signaling
- Market signaling with grades
- Strategic stability in repeated signaling games
- Job market signaling and employer learning
- An experimental analysis of Nash refinements in signaling games
- Testing for effects of cheap talk in a public goods game with private information
- Belief-based refinements in signalling games
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Persuasion with costly precision
- Signaling and mediation in games with common interests
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Strategic stability and uniqueness in signaling games
- Reputational bidding
- Optimal entry timing
- Efficient investment in a dynamic auction environment
- Forward induction equilibrium
- Biased procurement auctions
- Spread of (mis)information in social networks
- A model of electoral competition with incomplete information
- Signaling in markets with two-sided adverse selection
- Cooperation and signaling with uncertain social preferences
- Self-rejecting mechanisms
- Lies, damned lies, and political campaigns
- Forward induction, public randomization, and admissibility
- Incentive compatible strategies for general Stackelberg games with incomplete information
- Revision of conjectures about the opponent's utilities in signaling games
- The convergence of equilibrium strategies of approximating signaling games
- Reinsurance versus securitization of catastrophe risk
- Signaling future actions and the potential for sacrifice
- Strategic stability of equilibria in multi-sender signaling games
- Equilibrium selection in sequential games with imperfect information
- Bayesian persuasion by a privately informed sender
- Equilibria and Pareto optimal of markets with adverse selection
- Credible deviations from signaling equilibria
- Polling games and information revelation in the Downsian framework
- Subjective reasoning -- dynamic games
- Security issue announcement effects when firms use multiple signals
- Dynamic signaling and market breakdown
- Comparative statics of a signaling game: An experimental study
- Monopolistic signal provision
- A note on beliefs formation in signalling games
- Discretionary rewards as a feedback mechanism
- Fixed-equilibrium rationalizability in signaling games
- Observability, dominance, and induction in learning models
- Economic implications of imperfect quality certification
- Job-market signaling and screening: An experimental comparison
- Measurement distortion and missing contingencies in optimal contracts
- Informed principal problems in bilateral trading
- Signaling, forward induction, and stability in finitely repeated games
- Competition on many fronts: A Stackelberg signaling equilibrium
- Credible negotiation statements and coherent plans
- Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
- A never-a-weak-best-response test in infinite signaling games
- Risky shifts as multi-sender signaling
- A choice of auction format in seller cheating: a signaling game analysis
- Equity bargaining with common value
- Tax reporting game under uncertain tax laws and asymmetric information?
- Perturbed communication games with honest senders and naive receivers
- (Neutrally) optimal mechanism under adverse selection: the canonical insurance problem
- Rationalizability and epistemic priority orderings
- Delaying or deterring entry. A game-theoretic analysis
- Strong forward induction
- Signaling covertly acquired information
- Who emerges from smoke-filled rooms? Political parties and candidate selection
- Contractual signaling in a market environment
- Entry in first-price auctions with signaling
- Only time will tell: credible dynamic signaling
- Dynamic quality signaling with hidden actions
- Jeffrey Scot Banks (1958--2000)
- Testing the sender: when signaling is not enough
- Pervasive signaling
- On signalling and screening in markets with asymmetric information
- A model of competitive signaling with rich message spaces
- Extremism, campaigning and ambiguity
- Separating signaling equilibria under random relations between costs and attributes: continuum of attributes
- On non-monotonic strategic reasoning
- Signaling Games
- Conspicuous conservatism in risk choice
- Efficiency and surplus distribution in majoritarian reputational bargaining
- Forward induction reasoning and correct beliefs
- Reserve price signaling in first-price auctions with an uncertain number of bidders
- Extended proper equilibrium
- Auctions with an asking price
- Evolutionary learning in signalling games
- Security design without verifiable retention
- r-extreme signalling for congestion control
- SELLING A LEMON UNDER DEMAND UNCERTAINTY
- Payoff information and learning in signaling games
- Not so cheap talk: costly and discrete communication
- When to ask for an update: timing in strategic communication
- Informative tests in signaling environments
- Stable matching under forward‐induction reasoning
- Experimental evidence on coverage choices and contract prices in the market for corporate insurance
- An attorney fee as a signal in pretrial negotiation
- Eliciting private information with noise: the case of randomized response
- Bid signaling in first-price royalty auction
- Rational buyers search when prices increase
- On salience and signaling in sender-receiver games: partial pooling, learning, and focal points
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