Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games

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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 18249
Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
Fixed-equilibrium rationalizability in signaling games
Some dynamics of signaling games
A dynamic model of equilibrium selection in signaling markets
Sequential equilibria in signaling games
Sequential equilibria in signaling games
Separating equilibrium in quasi-linear signaling games
Strategic stability of equilibria in multi-sender signaling games
Comparative statics of a signaling game: An experimental study

Cited in

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Ideal reactive equilibrium
Competition on many fronts: A Stackelberg signaling equilibrium
Credible negotiation statements and coherent plans
Resource inequality in the war of attrition
Signaling games with endogenous types
Coherent Dempster-Shafer equilibrium and ambiguous signals
Sequential equilibria in signaling games
Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
The epistemic spirit of divinity
A never-a-weak-best-response test in infinite signaling games
Risky shifts as multi-sender signaling
A choice of auction format in seller cheating: a signaling game analysis
Tax reporting game under uncertain tax laws and asymmetric information?
Equity bargaining with common value
Harmful signaling in matching markets
Comparisons of standard royalty auctions with seller post-auction effort
Perturbed communication games with honest senders and naive receivers
(Neutrally) optimal mechanism under adverse selection: the canonical insurance problem
Monotone equilibrium in matching markets with signaling
Rationalizability and epistemic priority orderings
Delaying or deterring entry. A game-theoretic analysis
Two-person bargaining behavior in fixed discounting factors games with infinite horizon
Refining cheap-talk equilibria
Signaling games
Partially informative signaling
Strong forward induction
Market signaling with grades
Strategic stability in repeated signaling games
Job market signaling and employer learning
An experimental analysis of Nash refinements in signaling games
Testing for effects of cheap talk in a public goods game with private information
Who emerges from smoke-filled rooms? Political parties and candidate selection
Contractual signaling in a market environment
Signaling covertly acquired information
Belief-based refinements in signalling games
\(r\)-extreme signalling for congestion control
Entry in first-price auctions with signaling
Only time will tell: credible dynamic signaling
Persuasion with costly precision
Signaling and mediation in games with common interests
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 18249 (Why is no real title available?)
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7525466 (Why is no real title available?)
Dynamic quality signaling with hidden actions
Jeffrey Scot Banks (1958--2000)
Strategic stability and uniqueness in signaling games
Optimal entry timing
Efficient investment in a dynamic auction environment
Forward induction equilibrium
Biased procurement auctions
Reputational bidding
Testing the sender: when signaling is not enough
Pervasive signaling
Spread of (mis)information in social networks
A model of electoral competition with incomplete information
On signalling and screening in markets with asymmetric information
Linear Riley equilibria in quadratic signaling games
A model of competitive signaling with rich message spaces
Extremism, campaigning and ambiguity
Separating signaling equilibria under random relations between costs and attributes: continuum of attributes
On non-monotonic strategic reasoning
Conspicuous conservatism in risk choice
Signaling in markets with two-sided adverse selection
Efficiency and surplus distribution in majoritarian reputational bargaining
Cooperation and signaling with uncertain social preferences
Forward induction reasoning and correct beliefs
Reserve price signaling in first-price auctions with an uncertain number of bidders
Extended proper equilibrium
Auctions with an asking price
Lies, damned lies, and political campaigns
Self-rejecting mechanisms
Forward induction, public randomization, and admissibility
Incentive compatible strategies for general Stackelberg games with incomplete information
Revision of conjectures about the opponent's utilities in signaling games
Security design without verifiable retention
A framework for studying decentralized Bayesian learning with strategic agents
The convergence of equilibrium strategies of approximating signaling games
Payoff information and learning in signaling games
Evolutionary learning in signalling games
Not so cheap talk: costly and discrete communication
Signaling future actions and the potential for sacrifice
Reinsurance versus securitization of catastrophe risk
Strategic stability of equilibria in multi-sender signaling games
Equilibrium selection in sequential games with imperfect information
Bayesian persuasion by a privately informed sender
Credible deviations from signaling equilibria
When to ask for an update: timing in strategic communication
Informative tests in signaling environments
Stable matching under forward‐induction reasoning
Equilibria and Pareto optimal of markets with adverse selection
Experimental evidence on coverage choices and contract prices in the market for corporate insurance
Polling games and information revelation in the Downsian framework
Sequential equilibria in signaling games
An attorney fee as a signal in pretrial negotiation
Security issue announcement effects when firms use multiple signals
Subjective reasoning -- dynamic games
Eliciting private information with noise: the case of randomized response
Dynamic signaling and market breakdown
Hypothesis testing equilibrium in signalling games
Bid signaling in first-price royalty auction
Rational buyers search when prices increase

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