Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games

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Publication:3754461

DOI10.2307/1913604zbMath0617.90105OpenAlexW2119040993MaRDI QIDQ3754461

Joel Sobel, Jeffrey S. Banks

Publication date: 1987

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160524-120531056




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