Resource inequality in the war of attrition
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Publication:2689414
DOI10.1007/S00182-022-00809-0OpenAlexW4295665203MaRDI QIDQ2689414
Heng Liu, Gagan Ghosh, Bingchao Huangfu
Publication date: 10 March 2023
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-022-00809-0
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