Resource inequality in the war of attrition
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Publication:2689414
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Cites work
- A Theory of Exit in Duopoly
- A war of attrition with endogenous effort levels
- All-Pay Contests
- An analysis of the war of attrition and the all-pay auction
- Asymmetric budget constraints in a first-price auction
- Bargaining and Reputation
- Bargaining with imperfect commitment
- Bargaining with Two-sided Incomplete Information: An Infinite Horizon Model with Alternating Offers
- Cash breeds success: the role of financing constraints in patent races
- Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
- Expected revenue of all-pay auctions and first-price sealed-bid auctions with budget constraints
- Large contests
- Microeconomic theory
- On the continuous equilibria of affiliated-value, all-pay auctions with private budget constraints
- One-sided uncertainty and delay in reputational bargaining
- Patent competition, rent dissipation, and the persistence of monopoly: The role of research budgets
- Reputation and imperfect information
- Reputational bargaining and deadlines
- Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
- The war of attrition and the revelation of valuable information
- The War of Attrition in Continuous Time with Complete Information
- The war of attrition with incomplete information
Cited in
(7)- Wars of attrition with endogenously determined budget constraints
- Inequality and conflict: burning resources to support peace
- The allocation of resources in a multiple-trial war of attrition conflict
- A dynamic theory of resource wars
- Jump bidding in the war of attrition
- The impact of perceived strength in the war of attrition
- All-pay war
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