Expected revenue of all-pay auctions and first-price sealed-bid auctions with budget constraints
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Publication:1351257
DOI10.1016/0165-1765(95)00766-0zbMath0875.90273OpenAlexW2035239570MaRDI QIDQ1351257
Publication date: 27 February 1997
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(95)00766-0
Related Items (26)
Auctions vs. fixed pricing: competing for budget constrained buyers ⋮ All-pay auctions with private signals about opponents' values ⋮ Optimal auctions with endogenous budgets ⋮ Endogenous budget constraints ⋮ Auctions with loss‐averse bidders ⋮ Budget constraints in homogenous multi-unit auctions ⋮ Equilibrium existence and expected payoffs in all-pay auctions with constraints ⋮ Endogenous budget constraints in auctions ⋮ Efficient ex post implementable auctions and English auctions for bidders with non-quasilinear preferences ⋮ Resource inequality in the war of attrition ⋮ On the continuous equilibria of affiliated-value, all-pay auctions with private budget constraints ⋮ Liquidity risk in sequential trading networks ⋮ Simultaneous auctions with budgets: equilibrium existence and characterization ⋮ The dynamics of bidding markets with financial constraints ⋮ Sealed-bid auctions based on Cobb-Douglas utility function ⋮ Using Bayesian model to analyze the efficient allocation of research funds ⋮ High bids and broke winners ⋮ Optimal and efficient mechanisms with asymmetrically budget constrained buyers ⋮ Nonlinear pricing with budget constraint ⋮ Asymmetric budget constraints in a first-price auction ⋮ Optimal auctions for asymmetrically budget constrained bidders ⋮ Entry regulations and optimal prize allocation in parallel contests ⋮ Mechanisms for combinatorial auctions with budget constraints ⋮ Optimal Design for Multi-Item Auctions: A Robust Optimization Approach ⋮ Wars of attrition with endogenously determined budget constraints ⋮ Equilibrium of affiliated value second price auctions with financially constrained bidders: The two-bidder case
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