Expected revenue of all-pay auctions and first-price sealed-bid auctions with budget constraints
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Publication:1351257
DOI10.1016/0165-1765(95)00766-0zbMath0875.90273MaRDI QIDQ1351257
Publication date: 27 February 1997
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(95)00766-0
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
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