Entry regulations and optimal prize allocation in parallel contests

DOI10.1007/S10058-021-00250-XMaRDI QIDQ2070747zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Martin Grossmann

Publication date 24 January 2022

Published in Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-021-00250-x

zbMATH Keywords

aggregate taking behaviorentryparallel contests

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mechanism design theory (91B03)

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Cites work

• Aggregative games and best-reply potentials
• Comparative Statics of Contests and Rent-Seeking Games
• Competing for talents
• Contest architecture
• Contests with a stochastic number of players
• Election Goals and the Allocation of Campaign Resources
• Endogenous entry in contests
• Expected revenue of all-pay auctions and first-price sealed-bid auctions with budget constraints
• Multi-battle contests
• Population uncertainty in contests
• Racing with Uncertainty
• Rent seeking and entry
• Strategy and dynamics in contests
• The Colonel Blotto game
• The evolutionary stability of perfectly competitive behavior
• The non-constant-sum Colonel Blotto game
• The theory of contests: a survey
• Tournaments with prize-setting agents

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(5)

• Centralized vs decentralized contests
• Correction to: ``Entry regulations and optimal prize allocation in parallel contests
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• Reputation in contests
• A model of parallel contests

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