Entry regulations and optimal prize allocation in parallel contests

DOI10.1007/S10058-021-00250-XzbMATH Open1482.91058OpenAlexW3161101701MaRDI QIDQ2070747FDOQ2070747

Authors: Martin Grossmann 

Publication date: 24 January 2022

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-021-00250-x

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zbMATH Keywords

entryparallel contestsaggregate taking behavior

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Cites Work

• The Colonel Blotto game
• The theory of contests: a survey
• Contest architecture
• Strategy and dynamics in contests
• Aggregative games and best-reply potentials
• The evolutionary stability of perfectly competitive behavior
• Multi-battle contests
• Election Goals and the Allocation of Campaign Resources
• Comparative Statics of Contests and Rent-Seeking Games
• The non-constant-sum Colonel Blotto game
• Racing with Uncertainty
• Population uncertainty in contests
• Contests with a stochastic number of players
• Endogenous entry in contests
• Competing for talents
• Expected revenue of all-pay auctions and first-price sealed-bid auctions with budget constraints
• Rent seeking and entry
• Tournaments with prize-setting agents

Cited In (3)

• Centralized vs decentralized contests
• A model of parallel contests
• Correction to: ``Entry regulations and optimal prize allocation in parallel contests

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