Contests with endogenous entry
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Publication:2349416
DOI10.1007/s00182-014-0435-9zbMath1388.91104OpenAlexW2120263736MaRDI QIDQ2349416
Qiang Fu, Jingfeng Lu, Qian Jiao
Publication date: 22 June 2015
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-014-0435-9
Noncooperative games (91A10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Related Items (15)
Selecting contestants for a rent-seeking contest. A mechanism design approach ⋮ The limits of meritocracy ⋮ Sorting in iterated incumbency contests ⋮ Two-stage contests with preferences over style ⋮ Optimal contest design: tuning the heat ⋮ Contests with entry fees: theory and evidence ⋮ Conflicts in regular networks ⋮ Subsidy and taxation in all-pay auctions under incomplete information ⋮ Information disclosure in all-pay contests with costly entry ⋮ Submission costs in risk-taking contests ⋮ Optimal orchestration of rewards and punishments in rank-order contests ⋮ Nested Tullock contests with nonmonotone prizes ⋮ The optimal entry fee-prize ratio in Tullock contests ⋮ Winner's optimal reimbursement in contest ⋮ How noise affects effort in tournaments
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