How noise affects effort in tournaments

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2020.105065MaRDI QIDQ785535zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Mikhail Drugov, Dmitry Ryvkin

Publication date 7 August 2020

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2020.105065

zbMATH Keywords

noiseentropydispersive ordertournamentquantile stochastic dominance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Inequalities; stochastic orderings (60E15) Noncooperative games (91A10)

Recommendations

• When will the Range of Prizes in Tournaments Increase in the Noise or in the Number of Players?
• Fairness and desert in tournaments
• An alternative interpretation of random noise in rank-order tournaments
• The shape of luck and competition in winner-take-all tournaments
• The role of inequality on effort in tournaments

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3173999 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 627762 (Why is no real title available?)
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• Inequalities: theory of majorization and its applications
• Large contests
• Micro foundations of multi-prize lottery contests: a perspective of noisy performance ranking
• Mixed equilibria in Tullock contests
• NIST handbook of mathematical functions
• Nonparametric Statistical Data Modeling
• On Random Variables with Comparable Peakedness
• Signal orderings based on dispersion and the supply of private information in auctions
• Simplifying the Choice between Uncertain Prospects Where Preference is Nonlinear
• Stochastic orders
• Strategy and dynamics in contests
• The all-pay auction with complete information
• The optimal accuracy level in asymmetric contests
• The shape of luck and competition in winner-take-all tournaments
• The theory of contests: a survey
• When will the Range of Prizes in Tournaments Increase in the Noise or in the Number of Players?

Cited in

(13)

• The shape of luck and competition in winner-take-all tournaments
• Inequality and conflict outbreak
• Simple equilibria in general contests
• The role of inequality on effort in tournaments
• The limits of meritocracy
• Optimal risk taking in an uneven tournament game with risk averse players
• The role of noise variance on effort in group contests
• When will the Range of Prizes in Tournaments Increase in the Noise or in the Number of Players?
• Fairness and desert in tournaments
• Optimal contest design: tuning the heat
• Multi-prize contests with risk-averse players
• Tournament rewards and heavy tails
• The incentive effect of coarsening the competition structure in a tournament

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Uses Software

• DLMF

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