How noise affects effort in tournaments
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Publication:785535
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2020.105065zbMATH Open1447.91005OpenAlexW3020182076MaRDI QIDQ785535FDOQ785535
Authors: Mikhail Drugov, Dmitry Ryvkin
Publication date: 7 August 2020
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2020.105065
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- When will the Range of Prizes in Tournaments Increase in the Noise or in the Number of Players?
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- The shape of luck and competition in winner-take-all tournaments
- The role of inequality on effort in tournaments
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- When will the Range of Prizes in Tournaments Increase in the Noise or in the Number of Players?
- The shape of luck and competition in winner-take-all tournaments
Cited In (13)
- Inequality and conflict outbreak
- Simple equilibria in general contests
- The role of inequality on effort in tournaments
- The limits of meritocracy
- Optimal risk taking in an uneven tournament game with risk averse players
- The role of noise variance on effort in group contests
- When will the Range of Prizes in Tournaments Increase in the Noise or in the Number of Players?
- Optimal contest design: tuning the heat
- Fairness and desert in tournaments
- Multi-prize contests with risk-averse players
- Tournament rewards and heavy tails
- The incentive effect of coarsening the competition structure in a tournament
- The shape of luck and competition in winner-take-all tournaments
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