Optimal risk taking in an uneven tournament game with risk averse players

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2008.02.002MaRDI QIDQ952694zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Matthias Kräkel

Publication date 13 November 2008

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13352/1/200.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric equilibriarank-order tournamentsrisk taking

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Recommendations

• Multi-prize contests with risk-averse players
• How noise affects effort in tournaments
• Risk aversion in symmetric and asymmetric contests
• Tournament-stable equilibria
• No Guts, No Glory: An Experiment on Excessive Risk-Taking

Cites work

• A collective tournament
• A Model of Promotional Competition in Oligopoly
• Fixed-prize tournaments versus first-price auctions in innovation contests
• In defense of lawyers: Moral hazard as an aid to cooperation
• Moment preferences and polynomial utility
• Risk taking in selection contests
• The Wage Policy of a Firm

Cited in

(5)

• Hold or roll: reaching the goal in jeopardy race games
• Simple equilibria in general contests
• Social motives and risk-taking in investment decisions
• Competitive problem solving and the optimal prize schemes
• Less risk, more effort: how overconfidence reshapes tournament strategies

This page was built for publication: Optimal risk taking in an uneven tournament game with risk averse players

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q952694)