Optimal risk taking in an uneven tournament game with risk averse players

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2008.02.002zbMATH Open1148.91006OpenAlexW2088076529MaRDI QIDQ952694FDOQ952694

Authors: Matthias Kräkel 

Publication date: 13 November 2008

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13352/1/200.pdf

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zbMATH Keywords

risk takingrank-order tournamentsasymmetric equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• Risk taking in selection contests
• In defense of lawyers: Moral hazard as an aid to cooperation
• A Model of Promotional Competition in Oligopoly
• The Wage Policy of a Firm
• Fixed-prize tournaments versus first-price auctions in innovation contests
• Moment preferences and polynomial utility
• A collective tournament

Cited In (4)

• Simple equilibria in general contests
• Competitive problem solving and the optimal prize schemes
• Hold or roll: reaching the goal in jeopardy race games
• Social motives and risk-taking in investment decisions

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