In defense of lawyers: Moral hazard as an aid to cooperation

DOI10.1006/GAME.1999.0774MaRDI QIDQ1593751zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Karl Wärneryd

Publication date 25 January 2001

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1999.0774

zbMATH Keywords

moral hazardstrategic delegationdelegation equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05)

Recommendations

• Strategic Delegation By Unobservable Incentive Contracts
• On Delegation in Contests and the Survival of Payoff Maximizing Behavior
• Observable Contracts: Strategic Delegation and Cooperation
• A model of strategic delegation in contests between groups
• Delegated management in dynamic duopolies

Cites work

• A note on robustness of equilibria with respect to commitment opportunities
• Advances in the spatial theory of voting.
• Competing Vertical Structures: Precommitment and Renegotiation
• Contest success functions
• Observable Contracts: Strategic Delegation and Cooperation
• Unobserved Delegation

Cited in

(5)

• Sharing the effort costs in group contests
• Welfare maximizing contest success functions when the planner cannot commit
• Micro foundations of multi-prize lottery contests: a perspective of noisy performance ranking
• The generalized Stackelberg equilibrium of the all-pay auction with complete information
• Optimal risk taking in an uneven tournament game with risk averse players

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