In defense of lawyers: Moral hazard as an aid to cooperation

DOI10.1006/GAME.1999.0774zbMATH Open1006.91001OpenAlexW2005821458MaRDI QIDQ1593751FDOQ1593751

Karl Wärneryd

Publication date: 25 January 2001

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1999.0774

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zbMATH Keywords

moral hazardstrategic delegationdelegation equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05)

Cites Work

• Contest success functions
• Advances in the spatial theory of voting.
• Observable Contracts: Strategic Delegation and Cooperation
• Unobserved Delegation
• Competing Vertical Structures: Precommitment and Renegotiation
• A note on robustness of equilibria with respect to commitment opportunities

Cited In (5)

• Micro foundations of multi-prize lottery contests: a perspective of noisy performance ranking
• Welfare maximizing contest success functions when the planner cannot commit
• Optimal risk taking in an uneven tournament game with risk averse players
• The generalized Stackelberg equilibrium of the all-pay auction with complete information
• Sharing the effort costs in group contests

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