The generalized Stackelberg equilibrium of the all-pay auction with complete information

DOI10.1007/s10058-007-0029-0zbMath1274.91231MaRDI QIDQ2462904

Kai A. Konrad, Wolfgang Leininger

Publication date: 5 December 2007

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-007-0029-0

zbMATH Keywords

complete information; generalized cost; generalized Stackelberg game; sequential all-pay auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A65: Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games)

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

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Two-stage elimination games, Endogenous timing in general rent-seeking and conflict models, Sequential all-pay auctions with head starts, All-pay auctions with endogenous bid timing: an experimental study, A simple model of competition between teams, Designing incentives for online question-and-answer forums, Endogenous timing in three-player Tullock contests, Task arrangement in team competitions, A model of a two-stage all-pay auction, First-mover advantage in round-robin tournaments

Cites Work

• Endogenous timing in duopoly games: Stackelberg or Cournot equilibria
• In defense of lawyers: Moral hazard as an aid to cooperation
• The all-pay auction with complete information
• Asymmetric contests with general technologies
• Patent competition, rent dissipation, and the persistence of monopoly: The role of research budgets
• Price Leadership