Competing Vertical Structures: Precommitment and Renegotiation
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Publication:4846696
DOI10.2307/2171910zbMath0837.90032OpenAlexW2085170337MaRDI QIDQ4846696
Bruno Jullien, Bernard Caillaud, Pierre M. Picard
Publication date: 12 May 1996
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.cepremap.fr/depot/couv_orange/co9125.pdf
imperfect competitionstrategic complementarityprincipal-agent theoryrenegotiationagency contractsprecommitment effectsuninformed principals
Related Items (10)
Information sharing between vertical hierarchies ⋮ Unobservable contracts as precommitments ⋮ Vertical contracting with endogenous market structure ⋮ Commitment without reputation: renegotiation-proof contracts under asymmetric information ⋮ On competing mechanisms under exclusive competition ⋮ Are two a good representative for many? ⋮ Games played in a contracting environment ⋮ Participation constraints in adverse selection models ⋮ The role of commitment in repeated games ⋮ In defense of lawyers: Moral hazard as an aid to cooperation
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