Information sharing between vertical hierarchies
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2636781
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2013.02.005zbMath1281.91115OpenAlexW1992727357MaRDI QIDQ2636781
Salvatore Piccolo, Marco Pagnozzi
Publication date: 18 February 2014
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.csef.it/WP/wp322.pdf
Related Items (5)
Contract competition between hierarchies, managerial compensation and imperfectly correlated shocks ⋮ On the welfare effects of adverse selection in oligopolistic markets ⋮ Vagueness and information-sharing ⋮ On competing mechanisms under exclusive competition ⋮ Privatizing multi-subsidiary public firm in location model
Cites Work
- Duopoly information equilibrium: Cournot and Bertrand
- On the optimality of privacy in sequential contracting
- Optimal contracts with public ex post information
- Contract competition between hierarchies, managerial compensation and imperfectly correlated shocks
- Collusion and the organization of delegated expertise
- A general model of information sharing in oligopoly
- Information Sharing in Oligopoly
- Information Transmission--Cournot and Bertrand Equilibria
- Exchange of Cost Information in Oligopoly
- Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
- Multiple Bank Lending, Creditor Rights, and Information Sharing*
- Competing Vertical Structures: Precommitment and Renegotiation
This page was built for publication: Information sharing between vertical hierarchies
