Information Transmission--Cournot and Bertrand Equilibria

From MaRDI portal
Publication:3702792


DOI10.2307/2297593zbMath0579.90005MaRDI QIDQ3702792

Esther Gal-Or

Publication date: 1986

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2297593


91B24: Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets)


Related Items

Duopolistic competition with multiple scenarios and different attitudes toward uncertainty, Communication and influence, On the Existence of Nash Equilibrium in Bayesian Games, Communication in Cournot oligopoly, Robust results on the sharing of firm-specific information: incentives and welfare effects, The value to a firm of its rival learning, The interaction between corporate tax structure and disclosure policy, The value of information in oligopoly with demand uncertainty, On the existence of Bayesian Cournot equilibrium, Cournot competition and the social value of information, Information precision and asymptotic efficiency of industrial markets, Duopoly information sharing with differentiated products, Optimal research for Cournot oligopolists, Equilibrium prices in the Bertrand and Cournot oligopolies, Oligopoly, information and welfare, The impact of risk aversion on information transmission between firms, Duopoly experimentation: Cournot competition, Duopoly signal jamming, Sharing cost information: A counterexample, The value of public information in a Cournot duopoly., A comment on ``A general model of information sharing in oligopoly, by Michael Raith, The impact of cost uncertainty on Cournot oligopoly game with concave demand function, Limited capacity in project selection: competition through evidence production, The impact of cost uncertainty on Cournot oligopoly games, Supply chain coordination with information sharing: the informational advantage of GPOs, Information visibility and its impact in a supply chain, Information advantage in Cournot oligopoly, Pricing and horizontal information sharing in a supply chain with capacity constraint, Entry and espionage with noisy signals, Coalition-proof information exchanges, Information sharing between vertical hierarchies, INFORMATION SHARING ACROSS MULTIPLE BUYERS IN A SUPPLY CHAIN, ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ABOUT PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION