The value of information in oligopoly with demand uncertainty
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Consider a duopoly game in normal form, where demand is linear but unknown. Cost is also linear. Consider the Bayes-Nash equilibria of such a game. The main result of the paper is that the value of information is superadditive among the players if the game is supermodular. An analogous result for subadditive/submodular also holds.
Recommendations
Cites work
- Duopolists don't wish to share information
- Duopoly information equilibrium: Cournot and Bertrand
- Exchange of Cost Information in Oligopoly
- Information Sharing in Oligopoly
- Information Transmission--Cournot and Bertrand Equilibria
- Strategic Information Revelation
- The value of information in a simple duopoly model
- The values of information in some nonzero sum games
Cited in
(8)- The value of information in a simple duopoly model
- The value of public information in a Cournot duopoly.
- The value of information for price dependent demand
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 51090 (Why is no real title available?)
- Dynamic Oligopoly with Incomplete Information
- The effects of demand uncertainty on channel structure
- Duopoly firms' decisions on disclosing their R\&D investment information
- The competitive firm under price uncertainty: The role of information and hedging
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