The interaction between corporate tax structure and disclosure policy

DOI10.1007/S10436-009-0123-0MaRDI QIDQ691619zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Anil Arya, Brian Mittendorf

Publication date 3 December 2012

Published in Annals of Finance (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10436-009-0123-0

zbMATH Keywords

competitiondisclosureprogressive taxes

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Corporate finance (dividends, real options, etc.) (91G50)

Recommendations

• 公众企业信息披露的 Nash 均衡
• An informational rationale for action over disclosure
• A note on corporate taxation, limited liability, and asymmetric information
• The disclosure decision game: subsidies and incentives for R\&D activity
• Regulation with direct benefits of information disclosure and imperfect monitoring

Cites work

• A general model of information sharing in oligopoly
• Exchange of Cost Information in Oligopoly
• Information Sharing in Oligopoly
• Information Transmission--Cournot and Bertrand Equilibria
• Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs

Cited in

(4)

• Equilibrium selection in sequential games with imperfect information
• Corporate taxation and the efficiency gains of the 1986 tax reform act
• A note on corporate taxation, limited liability, and asymmetric information
• Transparency, Tax Pressure, and Access to Finance *

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