Partial commitment in an endogenous timing duopoly
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Recommendations
- Endogenous timing with incomplete information and with observable delay.
- Duopoly with Endogenous Strategic Timing: Stackelberg Regained
- Endogenous timing in duopoly games: Stackelberg or Cournot equilibria
- Commitment robust equilibria and endogenous timing
- To commit or not to commit: Endogenous timing in experimental duopoly markets
Cites work
- A Theory of Endogenous Commitment
- A bargaining model based on the commitment tactic
- A continuum of commitment
- A general model of information sharing in oligopoly
- Advertising and Coordination
- Asymmetric Information Acquisition and Behavior in Role Choice Models: An Endogenously Generated Signaling Game
- Bargaining with imperfect commitment
- Duopoly information equilibrium: Cournot and Bertrand
- Endogenous Games and Mechanisms: Side Payments Among Players
- Endogenous Stackelberg equilibria with incomplete information
- Endogenous Stackelberg leadership
- Endogenous timing in duopoly games: Stackelberg or Cournot equilibria
- Endogenous timing in duopoly: experimental evidence
- Endogenous timing with incomplete information and with observable delay.
- Exchange of Cost Information in Oligopoly
- Information Transmission--Cournot and Bertrand Equilibria
- Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis
- Second-mover advantage and price leadership in Bertrand duopoly
- Signaling future actions and the potential for sacrifice
- Simultaneous vs. sequential price competition with incomplete information
- Stackelberg versus Cournot equilibrium
- The effect of endogenous timing on coordination under asymmetric information: an experimental study
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