Partial commitment in an endogenous timing duopoly
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Publication:2177802
DOI10.1007/s10479-018-03130-wzbMath1437.91280OpenAlexW2910522390WikidataQ128596318 ScholiaQ128596318MaRDI QIDQ2177802
Publication date: 6 May 2020
Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-018-03130-w
2-person games (91A05) Applications of game theory (91A80) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)
Cites Work
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- A bargaining model based on the commitment tactic
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- Exchange of Cost Information in Oligopoly
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- Advertising and Coordination
- Asymmetric Information Acquisition and Behavior in Role Choice Models: An Endogenously Generated Signaling Game
- A Theory of Endogenous Commitment
- Endogenous Games and Mechanisms: Side Payments Among Players
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