Playing Cournot although they shouldn't: endogenous timing in experimental duopolies with asymmetric cost
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Publication:2503430
DOI10.1007/s00199-003-0456-2zbMath1127.91005OpenAlexW2102651111WikidataQ57920607 ScholiaQ57920607MaRDI QIDQ2503430
Steffen Huck, Hans-Theo Normann, Miguel A. Fonseca
Publication date: 21 September 2006
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-003-0456-2
Noncooperative games (91A10) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Experimental studies (91A90)
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