Randomized strategy equilibrium in the action commitment game with costs of leading

DOI10.1016/J.ORL.2011.02.004MaRDI QIDQ2275576zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Toshihiro Matsumura, Takeshi Murooka, Akira Ogawa

Publication date 9 August 2011

Published in Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2011.02.004

zbMATH Keywords

cost of leadingendogenous timingmixed strategy equilibriastrategic complements

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05)

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Cites work

• An Approach to Homotopy and Degree Theory
• Cournot duopoly with two production periods
• Cournot duopoly with two production periods and cost differentials
• Endogenous Stackelberg equilibria with identical firms
• Endogenous Stackelberg equilibria with incomplete information
• Endogenous timing in duopoly games: Stackelberg or Cournot equilibria
• On the efficiency of Bertrand and Cournot equilibria with product differentiation
• Playing Cournot although they shouldn't: endogenous timing in experimental duopolies with asymmetric cost
• To commit or not to commit: Endogenous timing in experimental duopoly markets

Cited in

(3)

• Endogenous timing, market research, and demand uncertainty
• Costly leader games with a probabilistically non-strategic leader
• Price leadership in a homogeneous product market

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