Randomized strategy equilibrium in the action commitment game with costs of leading

DOI10.1016/j.orl.2011.02.004zbMath1218.91007OpenAlexW2063430586MaRDI QIDQ2275576

Takeshi Murooka, Akira Ogawa, Toshihiro Matsumura

Publication date: 9 August 2011

Published in: Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2011.02.004

zbMATH Keywords

strategic complementsendogenous timingmixed strategy equilibriacost of leading

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05)

Related Items (2)

Price leadership in a homogeneous product market ⋮ Endogenous timing, market research, and demand uncertainty

Cites Work

• To commit or not to commit: Endogenous timing in experimental duopoly markets
• On the efficiency of Bertrand and Cournot equilibria with product differentiation
• Cournot duopoly with two production periods
• Cournot duopoly with two production periods and cost differentials
• Endogenous timing in duopoly games: Stackelberg or Cournot equilibria
• Endogenous Stackelberg equilibria with incomplete information
• Endogenous Stackelberg equilibria with identical firms
• Playing Cournot although they shouldn't: endogenous timing in experimental duopolies with asymmetric cost
• An Approach to Homotopy and Degree Theory

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