Randomized strategy equilibrium in the action commitment game with costs of leading
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Publication:2275576
DOI10.1016/j.orl.2011.02.004zbMath1218.91007MaRDI QIDQ2275576
Takeshi Murooka, Akira Ogawa, Toshihiro Matsumura
Publication date: 9 August 2011
Published in: Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2011.02.004
91A05: 2-person games
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Price leadership in a homogeneous product market, Endogenous timing, market research, and demand uncertainty
Cites Work
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