To commit or not to commit: Endogenous timing in experimental duopoly markets
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Publication:700115
DOI10.1006/game.2001.0889zbMath1032.91604MaRDI QIDQ700115
Wieland Müller, Steffen Huck, Hans-Theo Normann
Publication date: 30 September 2002
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://research.tilburguniversity.edu/en/publications/52f12df4-ce93-42ae-b8f4-5e0c1f8f6e2b
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
91A90: Experimental studies
91A55: Games of timing
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Cites Work
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- On flexibility in oligopoly
- Cournot duopoly with two production periods
- Endogenous timing in duopoly games: Stackelberg or Cournot equilibria
- Endogenous Stackelberg leadership
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- Perfect versus imperfect observability -- an experimental test of Bagwell's result
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- Commitment and observability in games
- Equilibrium Refinement for Infinite Normal-Form Games