To commit or not to commit: Endogenous timing in experimental duopoly markets

DOI10.1006/GAME.2001.0889MaRDI QIDQ700115zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Steffen Huck, W. Müller, Hans-Theo Normann

Publication date 30 September 2002

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://research.tilburguniversity.edu/en/publications/52f12df4-ce93-42ae-b8f4-5e0c1f8f6e2b

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Games of timing (91A55) Experimental studies (91A90)

Recommendations

• Playing Cournot although they shouldn't: endogenous timing in experimental duopolies with asymmetric cost
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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 47120 (Why is no real title available?)
• Commitment and observability in games
• Cournot duopoly with two production periods
• Endogenous Stackelberg equilibria with incomplete information
• Endogenous Stackelberg leadership
• Endogenous sequencing of firm decisions
• Endogenous timing in duopoly games: Stackelberg or Cournot equilibria
• Equilibrium Refinement for Infinite Normal-Form Games
• On flexibility in oligopoly
• Perfect versus imperfect observability -- an experimental test of Bagwell's result

Cited in

(14)

• Playing Cournot although they shouldn't: endogenous timing in experimental duopolies with asymmetric cost
• Voluntary leadership and asymmetric endowments in the investment game
• Partial commitment in an endogenous timing duopoly
• Voluntary leadership: motivation and influence
• Contests with endogenous entry
• Randomized strategy equilibrium in the action commitment game with costs of leading
• A cognitive hierarchy model of behavior in the action commitment game
• Rebate decisions and leadership strategy in competing supply chain with heterogeneous consumers
• Endogenous timing in duopoly: experimental evidence
• Commitment for storable good duopoly
• Price leadership and firm size asymmetry: an experimental analysis
• Endogenous timing with incomplete information and with observable delay.
• Cheap talk and cooperation in Stackelberg games
• Who should be pricing leader in the presence of customer returns?

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• Z-Tree

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