To commit or not to commit: Endogenous timing in experimental duopoly markets

DOI10.1006/game.2001.0889zbMath1032.91604OpenAlexW2114352307MaRDI QIDQ700115

Wieland Müller, Hans-Theo Normann, Steffen Huck

Publication date: 30 September 2002

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://research.tilburguniversity.edu/en/publications/52f12df4-ce93-42ae-b8f4-5e0c1f8f6e2b

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Experimental studies (91A90) Games of timing (91A55)

Related Items (11)

Voluntary leadership and asymmetric endowments in the investment game ⋮ Price leadership and firm size asymmetry: an experimental analysis ⋮ Endogenous timing in duopoly: experimental evidence ⋮ Cheap talk and cooperation in Stackelberg games ⋮ Who should be pricing leader in the presence of customer returns? ⋮ A cognitive hierarchy model of behavior in the action commitment game ⋮ Rebate decisions and leadership strategy in competing supply chain with heterogeneous consumers ⋮ Voluntary leadership: motivation and influence ⋮ Randomized strategy equilibrium in the action commitment game with costs of leading ⋮ Contests with endogenous entry ⋮ Endogenous timing with incomplete information and with observable delay.

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• On flexibility in oligopoly
• Cournot duopoly with two production periods
• Endogenous timing in duopoly games: Stackelberg or Cournot equilibria
• Endogenous Stackelberg leadership
• Endogenous Stackelberg equilibria with incomplete information
• Perfect versus imperfect observability -- an experimental test of Bagwell's result
• Endogenous sequencing of firm decisions
• Commitment and observability in games
• Equilibrium Refinement for Infinite Normal-Form Games

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