Endogenous Stackelberg leadership
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Publication:1300676
DOI10.1006/game.1998.0687zbMath0938.91011OpenAlexW2061017563MaRDI QIDQ1300676
Sjaak Hurkens, Eric E. C. van Damme
Publication date: 25 June 2000
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10230/713
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