Firm scale and the endogenous timing of entry: A choice between commitment and flexibility
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Publication:2365342
DOI10.1006/jeth.1996.0102zbMath0870.90048MaRDI QIDQ2365342
Venkatraman Sadanand, Asha Sadanand
Publication date: 23 February 1997
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1996.0102
Stackelberg equilibrium; demand uncertainty; Cournot equilibria; extreme types of market structure; stochastic oligopoly
91A65: Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games)
93E03: Stochastic systems in control theory (general)
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
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