Firm scale and the endogenous timing of entry: A choice between commitment and flexibility
DOI10.1006/JETH.1996.0102zbMATH Open0870.90048OpenAlexW2022850194MaRDI QIDQ2365342FDOQ2365342
Authors: Asha Sadanand, Venkatraman Sadanand 
Publication date: 23 February 1997
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1996.0102
Recommendations
demand uncertaintyStackelberg equilibriumCournot equilibriaextreme types of market structurestochastic oligopoly
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Stochastic systems in control theory (general) (93E03)
Cited In (14)
- Location of public and private firms under endogenous timing of choices
- How risk disciplines pre-commitment
- Strategic Investment and Timing of Entry
- A price-setting game with a nonatomic fringe.
- Quantity-setting games with a dominant firm
- Investment timing and capacity choice under uncertainty
- Endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly under demand uncertainty
- Endogenous timing, market research, and demand uncertainty
- Games with espionage
- Combining the endogenous choice of price/quantity and timing
- Endogenous Stackelberg leadership
- Short-run policy commitment when investment timing is endogenous: 'more harm than good?'
- Strategic advance sales, demand uncertainty and overcommitment
- Conformity and influence
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