Strategic Investment and Timing of Entry

DOI10.2307/2527000zbMath0812.90030OpenAlexW2058369734MaRDI QIDQ4320059

Simon P. Anderson, Maxim Engers

Publication date: 15 January 1995

Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2527000

zbMATH Keywords

Stackelberg modelcompetition over entry timesequential output choice model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (11)

DEMAND-INDUCED ENDOGENOUS PRICE LEADERSHIP ⋮ Combining the endogenous choice of timing and competition version in a mixed duopoly ⋮ What role should public firms play in the upstream market? ⋮ Advertising in a differential oligopoly game ⋮ Stackelberg leadership and managerial delegation under hyperbolic demand ⋮ The profitability of small horizontal mergers with nonlinear demand functions ⋮ Return distributions of strategic growth options ⋮ Quantity-setting games with a dominant firm ⋮ Endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly under demand uncertainty ⋮ Endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly ⋮ Static and dynamic best-response potential functions for the non-linear Cournot game

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