Quantity-setting games with a dominant firm
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Publication:969638
DOI10.1007/s00712-010-0108-5zbMath1229.91219MaRDI QIDQ969638
Publication date: 7 May 2010
Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.eeri.eu/documents/wp/EERI_RP_2009_25.pdf
91A65: Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games)
91A40: Other game-theoretic models
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
91B54: Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand)
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Leaders and competitors, Stackelberg leadership with product differentiation and endogenous entry: some comparative static and limiting results
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