A Multiple Leader Stackelberg Model and Analysis
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Publication:3703541
DOI10.1287/opre.32.2.390zbMath0581.90008OpenAlexW2117179049MaRDI QIDQ3703541
Publication date: 1984
Published in: Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.32.2.390
existenceuniquenessCournot oligopolymarket structureduopolyStackelberg modelcomputation of an equilibrium solutionmultiple leader-follower model
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