A note on Stackelberg competition

DOI10.1007/s00712-010-0187-3zbMath1215.91032OpenAlexW2068435804MaRDI QIDQ547314

Ludovic A. Julien

Publication date: 1 July 2011

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-010-0187-3

zbMATH Keywords

strategic complementaritiesmarket demand functionsreaction functionsStackelberg-Nash equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (6)

Insider trading with product differentiation ⋮ Leaders and competitors ⋮ On noncooperative oligopoly equilibrium in the multiple leader-follower game ⋮ On the first mover advantage in Stackelberg quantity games ⋮ On Stackelberg–Nash Equilibria in Bilevel Optimization Games ⋮ Bilevel Optimization: Theory, Algorithms, Applications and a Bibliography

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Perfect competition as the limit of a hierarchical market game
• Endogenous timing in duopoly games: Stackelberg or Cournot equilibria
• Chaos in duopoly pricing
• Stackelberg versus Cournot equilibrium
• A two-stage Bertrand-Edgeworth game
• A Stochastic Multiple-Leader Stackelberg Model: Analysis, Computation, and Application
• First Mover and Second Mover Advantages
• A Multiple Leader Stackelberg Model and Analysis
• A Theory of Exit in Duopoly
• A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, II: Price Competition, Kinked Demand Curves, and Edgeworth Cycles
• A Generalized Oligopoly Model
• Stackelberg-Nash-Cournot Equilibria: Characterizations and Computations

This page was built for publication: A note on Stackelberg competition