Perfect competition as the limit of a hierarchical market game
From MaRDI portal
Publication:899872
DOI10.1016/0165-1765(86)90215-6zbMath1328.91042OpenAlexW2012203214MaRDI QIDQ899872
Publication date: 1 January 2016
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(86)90215-6
Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) General equilibrium theory (91B50)
Related Items (11)
STRATEGIC DELEGATION IN A STACKELBERG GAME WITH MULTIPLE STAGES ⋮ DEMAND-INDUCED ENDOGENOUS PRICE LEADERSHIP ⋮ On hierarchical competition in oligopoly ⋮ Executive compensation and competitive pressure in the product market: how does firm entry shape managerial incentives? ⋮ Stackelberg versus Cournot: a differential game approach ⋮ Second mover disadvantages in a three-player Stackelberg game with private information ⋮ A GENERALIZED OLIGOPOLY MODEL WITH CONJECTURAL VARIATIONS ⋮ On noncooperative oligopoly equilibrium in the multiple leader-follower game ⋮ A note on Stackelberg competition ⋮ Stackelberg versus Cournot equilibrium ⋮ On Stackelberg–Nash Equilibria in Bilevel Optimization Games
Cites Work
This page was built for publication: Perfect competition as the limit of a hierarchical market game
