STRATEGIC DELEGATION IN A STACKELBERG GAME WITH MULTIPLE STAGES

DOI10.1142/S0219198911003039zbMath1259.91003arXiv1107.3198MaRDI QIDQ3166240

Paraskevas V. Lekeas, Giorgos Stamatopoulos

Publication date: 10 October 2012

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1107.3198

zbMATH Keywords

delegationlate-movers' advantagesequential competition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• The value of commitment in Stackelberg games with observation costs
• Perfect competition as the limit of a hierarchical market game
• Commitment, first-mover-, and second-mover advantage
• Imperfectly observable commitments in \(n\)-player games
• Games with imperfectly observable commitment
• Commitment and observability in games
• First Mover and Second Mover Advantages
• First Mover Disadvantages with Private Information
• Unobserved Delegation

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