A NOTE ON ENDOGENOUS TIMING WITH STRATEGIC DELEGATION: UNILATERAL EXTERNALITY CASE

DOI10.1111/j.1467-8586.2011.00392.xzbMath1254.91368OpenAlexW1984333281MaRDI QIDQ4899990

Kangsik Choi, Yuanzhu Lu

Publication date: 10 January 2013

Published in: Bulletin of Economic Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8586.2011.00392.x

zbMATH Keywords

endogenous timingexternalityStackelbergmanagerial delegation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Cites Work

• Strategic delegation under quality competition
• Endogenous timing in duopoly games: Stackelberg or Cournot equilibria
• Stackelberg versus Cournot equilibrium
• Endogenous Stackelberg leadership
• Identification of classes of differential games for which the open loop is a degenerate feedback Nash equilibrium
• Endogenous price leadership
• Endogenous timing in two-player games: A counterexample
• Second-mover advantage and price leadership in Bertrand duopoly
• Duopoly with Endogenous Strategic Timing: Stackelberg Regained

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