A note on endogenous timing with strategic delegation: unilateral externality case
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Publication:4899990
DOI10.1111/J.1467-8586.2011.00392.XzbMATH Open1254.91368OpenAlexW1984333281MaRDI QIDQ4899990FDOQ4899990
Publication date: 10 January 2013
Published in: Bulletin of Economic Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8586.2011.00392.x
Recommendations
- The timing of contracting with externalities
- Endogenous timing with incomplete information and with observable delay.
- Endogenous timing in vertically-related markets
- Choosing price or quantity? The role of delegation and network externalities
- Strategic delegation in a Stackelberg game with multiple stages
Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Special types of economic equilibria (91B52)
Cites Work
- Second-mover advantage and price leadership in Bertrand duopoly
- Endogenous timing in duopoly games: Stackelberg or Cournot equilibria
- Stackelberg versus Cournot equilibrium
- Endogenous Stackelberg leadership
- Endogenous price leadership
- Endogenous timing in two-player games: A counterexample
- Duopoly with Endogenous Strategic Timing: Stackelberg Regained
- Strategic delegation under quality competition
- Identification of classes of differential games for which the open loop is a degenerate feedback Nash equilibrium
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