Identification of classes of differential games for which the open loop is a degenerate feedback Nash equilibrium

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Publication:1821711


DOI10.1007/BF00939082zbMath0616.90108MaRDI QIDQ1821711

Chaim Fershtman

Publication date: 1987

Published in: Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)


91A23: Differential games (aspects of game theory)


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