Credibility of incentive equilibrium strategies in linear-state differential games
DOI10.1007/S10957-005-4722-2zbMATH Open1101.91012OpenAlexW2018020262MaRDI QIDQ852115FDOQ852115
Authors: Guiomar Martín-Herrán, Georges Zaccour
Publication date: 27 November 2006
Published in: Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10957-005-4722-2
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- Publication:4206594
cooperationcredibilityincentive equilibrialinear-state differential gamesenvironmental economicsknowledge accumulation
Cooperative games (91A12) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Differential games and control (49N70) Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23)
Cites Work
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- A cooperative incentive equilibrium for a resource management problem
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- Economic Development and Agreeable Redistribution in Capitalism: Efficient Game Equilibria in a Two-Class Neoclassical Growth Model
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- On the Economics of International Fisheries
- Identification of classes of differential games for which the open loop is a degenerate feedback Nash equilibrium
- SUSTAINABILITY OF COOPERATION OVERTIME IN LINEAR-QUADRATIC DIFFERENTIAL GAMES
Cited In (15)
- Incentive schemes using the follower's strategies in differential games
- Strong time-consistent core for a class of linear-state games
- Adjustment of an affine contract with a fixed-point iteration
- Does flexibility facilitate sustainability of cooperation over time? A case study from environmental economics
- Sustainability of Cooperation in Dynamic Games Played over Event Trees
- Incentive equilibrium in an overlapping-generations environmental game
- Incentive equilibrium strategies in dynamic games played over event trees
- Stackelberg solutions of differential games in the class of nonanticipative strategies
- Three-level incentive strategies in differential games
- The Leitmann-Schmitendorf advertising differential game
- Pareto improvements of Nash equilibria in differential games
- Non-linear Incentive Equilibrium Strategies for a Transboundary Pollution Differential Game
- Credible Linear-Incentive Equilibrium Strategies in Linear-Quadratic Differential Games
- Credibility in Stackelberg games
- Employee-stock-options, production/service functions and game theory
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