Credibility of incentive equilibrium strategies in linear-state differential games

DOI10.1007/S10957-005-4722-2MaRDI QIDQ852115zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Guiomar Martín-Herrán, Georges Zaccour

Publication date 27 November 2006

Published in Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10957-005-4722-2

zbMATH Keywords

cooperationcredibilityincentive equilibrialinear-state differential gamesenvironmental economicsknowledge accumulation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Differential games and control (49N70) Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 824670 (Why is no real title available?)
• A cooperative incentive equilibrium for a resource management problem
• A note on nonzero-sum differential games with bargaining solution
• Agreeability and time consistency in linear-state differential games
• Channel coordination over time: Incentive equilibria and credibility
• Cooperative equilibria in differential games
• Economic Development and Agreeable Redistribution in Capitalism: Efficient Game Equilibria in a Two-Class Neoclassical Growth Model
• Efficient equilibria in a differential game of capitalism
• Identification of classes of differential games for which the open loop is a degenerate feedback Nash equilibrium
• Identification of efficient subgame-perfect Nash equilibria in a class of differential games
• Incentive equilibrium strategies and welfare allocation in a dynamic game of pollution control
• Incentive strategies and equilibria for dynamic games with delayed information
• On the Economics of International Fisheries
• SUSTAINABILITY OF COOPERATION OVERTIME IN LINEAR-QUADRATIC DIFFERENTIAL GAMES
• Time consistent side payments in a dynamic game of downstream pollution
• Time-consistent Shapley value allocation of pollution cost reduction

Cited in

(15)

• Stackelberg solutions of differential games in the class of nonanticipative strategies
• Credible Linear-Incentive Equilibrium Strategies in Linear-Quadratic Differential Games
• Employee-stock-options, production/service functions and game theory
• Sustainability of Cooperation in Dynamic Games Played over Event Trees
• Does flexibility facilitate sustainability of cooperation over time? A case study from environmental economics
• Three-level incentive strategies in differential games
• Strong time-consistent core for a class of linear-state games
• Incentive equilibrium in an overlapping-generations environmental game
• Incentive equilibrium strategies in dynamic games played over event trees
• Adjustment of an affine contract with a fixed-point iteration
• Incentive schemes using the follower's strategies in differential games
• The Leitmann-Schmitendorf advertising differential game
• Pareto improvements of Nash equilibria in differential games
• Credibility in Stackelberg games
• Non-linear incentive equilibrium strategies for a transboundary pollution differential game

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