Non-linear Incentive Equilibrium Strategies for a Transboundary Pollution Differential Game

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-19107-8_11zbMath1454.91150OpenAlexW2969178125MaRDI QIDQ5140362

Guiomar Martín-Herrán, Javier de Frutos

Publication date: 15 December 2020

Published in: International Series in Operations Research & Management Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/37933

zbMATH Keywords

differential gamescredibilityenvironmental economicsincentive equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) Applications of game theory (91A80) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

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