Incentive equilibrium in an overlapping-generations environmental game

DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2006.12.048zbMath1137.91563MaRDI QIDQ2455631

Michèle Breton, Georges Zaccour, Abderrahmane Sokri

Publication date: 25 October 2007

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2006.12.048

zbMATH Keywords

credibility; environment; incentive strategies; Overlapping-generations models

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A80: Applications of game theory

91B76: Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.)

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Cites Work

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