Incentive equilibrium strategies and welfare allocation in a dynamic game of pollution control

From MaRDI portal
Publication:1592889

DOI10.1016/S0005-1098(00)00119-9zbMath1038.91509OpenAlexW2010282961WikidataQ126376709 ScholiaQ126376709MaRDI QIDQ1592889

Georges Zaccour, Steffen Jørgensen

Publication date: 2001

Published in: Automatica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0005-1098(00)00119-9




Related Items (24)

Equilibrium investment strategies in foreign environmental projectsCredibility of incentive equilibrium strategies in linear-state differential gamesAn OLG Differential Game of Pollution Control with the Risk of a Catastrophic Climate ChangeTransboundary Pollution Abatement, Emission Permits Trading and Compensation Mechanism: A Differential Game AnalysisGame theory of pollution: national policies and their international effectsInvestment in cleaner technologies in a transboundary pollution dynamic game: a numerical investigationThe Leitmann-Schmitendorf advertising differential gameEquilibrium strategies in a multiregional transboundary pollution differential game with spatially distributed controlsComputation of characteristic function values for linear-state differential gamesSpatial vs. non-spatial transboundary pollution control in a class of cooperative and non-cooperative dynamic gamesNon-linear Incentive Equilibrium Strategies for a Transboundary Pollution Differential GameIncentive equilibrium in an overlapping-generations environmental gameA differential game of transboundary industrial pollution with emission permits tradingEfficient Markov perfect Nash equilibria: theory and application to dynamic fishery gamesA cooperative stochastic differential game of transboundary industrial pollution between two asymmetric nationsDynamic games in the economics of natural resources: a surveyCredible Linear-Incentive Equilibrium Strategies in Linear-Quadratic Differential GamesRobust control in green production managementA game-theoretic formulation of joint implementation of environmental projectsModeling and computation of transboundary pollution game based on joint implementation mechanismA TIME-CONSISTENT AGREEMENT IN AN INTERREGIONAL DIFFERENTIAL GAME ON POLLUTION AND TRADEA differential game of joint implementation of environmental projectsDoes flexibility facilitate sustainability of cooperation over time? A case study from environmental economicsOptimal control for transboundary pollution under inter-temporal transfer of emission permits: a differential game approach



Cites Work


This page was built for publication: Incentive equilibrium strategies and welfare allocation in a dynamic game of pollution control