Transboundary pollution abatement, emission permits trading and compensation mechanism: a differential game analysis
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Publication:5072239
Recommendations
- Optimal abatement and emission permit trading policies in a dynamic transboundary pollution game
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 176610 (Why is no real title available?)
- A differential game analysis of multipollutant transboundary pollution in river basin
- A differential game of R\&D investment for pollution abatement in different market structures
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- Dynamic optimal strategies in transboundary pollution game under learning by doing
- Dynamically consistent cooperative solution in a differential game of transboundary industrial pollution
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- Optimal abatement and emission permit trading policies in a dynamic transboundary pollution game
- Optimal institutional arrangements for transboundary pollutants in a second-best world: evidence from a differential game with asymmetric players
- Pollution control in open economies: implications of within-period interactions for dynamic game equilibrium
- Pollution control: A differential game approach
- Population growth and technological change in a global warming model
Cited in
(13)- Optimal institutional arrangements for transboundary pollutants in a second-best world: evidence from a differential game with asymmetric players
- A differential game of ecological compensation criterion for transboundary pollution abatement under learning by doing
- A two-level dynamic game of carbon emission trading between Russia, China, and annex B countries
- The externalities problem of transboundary and persistent pollution
- Model of transfer tax on transboundary water pollution in China's river basin
- Optimal abatement and emission permit trading policies in a dynamic transboundary pollution game
- A differential game of transboundary industrial pollution with emission permits trading
- Dynamic decision of transboundary basin pollution under emission permits and pollution abatement
- Dynamic optimal control of transboundary pollution abatement under learning-by-doing depreciation
- Harmonizing model with transfer tax on water pollution across regional boundaries in a China's lake basin
- Investment in cleaner technologies in a transboundary pollution dynamic game: a numerical investigation
- Modeling and computation of transboundary pollution game based on joint implementation mechanism
- Numerical modelling of cooperative and noncooperative three transboundary pollution problems under learning by doing in Three Gorges Reservoir Area
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