Transboundary pollution abatement, emission permits trading and compensation mechanism: a differential game analysis
DOI10.1142/S021919892050022XzbMATH Open1489.91188OpenAlexW3104151064MaRDI QIDQ5072239FDOQ5072239
Huiquan Li, Genlong Guo, Zhaoquan Jian
Publication date: 26 April 2022
Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s021919892050022x
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Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Differential games and control (49N70) Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23)
Cites Work
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- Myopic versus farsighted behaviors in a low-carbon supply chain with reference emission effects
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Cited In (5)
- Optimal institutional arrangements for transboundary pollutants in a second-best world: evidence from a differential game with asymmetric players
- A two-level dynamic game of carbon emission trading between Russia, China, and annex B countries
- The externalities problem of transboundary and persistent pollution
- Dynamic decision of transboundary basin pollution under emission permits and pollution abatement
- Investment in cleaner technologies in a transboundary pollution dynamic game: a numerical investigation
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