Optimal abatement and emission permit trading policies in a dynamic transboundary pollution game
DOI10.1007/s13235-018-0260-zzbMath1411.91437OpenAlexW2800487597WikidataQ129960242 ScholiaQ129960242MaRDI QIDQ1741179
Shuhua Chang, Suresh P. Sethi, Xin Yu Wang
Publication date: 3 May 2019
Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-018-0260-z
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equationdifferential gametransboundary pollutionemission permits tradingpollution abatement strategies
Noncooperative games (91A10) Cooperative games (91A12) Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)
Related Items (7)
Cites Work
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