Optimal institutional arrangements for transboundary pollutants in a second-best world: evidence from a differential game with asymmetric players

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Publication:1604643

DOI10.1006/jeem.2000.1163zbMath1050.91018OpenAlexW3125844915MaRDI QIDQ1604643

John A. List, Charles F. Mason

Publication date: 8 July 2002

Published in: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeem.2000.1163




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