Optimal institutional arrangements for transboundary pollutants in a second-best world: evidence from a differential game with asymmetric players

DOI10.1006/JEEM.2000.1163MaRDI QIDQ1604643zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors John A. List, C. F. Mason

Publication date 8 July 2002

Published in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1006/jeem.2000.1163

zbMATH Keywords

differential gamepollution controlasymmetric payoffs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23)

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• Computation of characteristic function values for linear-state differential games
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• Equilibrium investment strategies in foreign environmental projects
• Credible Linear-Incentive Equilibrium Strategies in Linear-Quadratic Differential Games
• A differential game analysis of multipollutant transboundary pollution in river basin
• Collaborative environmental management: a review of the literature
• A differential game of ecological compensation criterion for transboundary pollution abatement under learning by doing
• Do small players undermine cooperation in asymmetric games?
• Developments in differential game theory and numerical methods: Economic and management applications
• An empirical study of transboundary air pollution of the Beijing-Tianjin region
• Numerical modelling of cooperative and noncooperative three transboundary pollution problems under learning by doing in Three Gorges Reservoir Area
• SUSTAINABILITY OF COOPERATION OVERTIME IN LINEAR-QUADRATIC DIFFERENTIAL GAMES
• Optimal abatement and emission permit trading policies in a dynamic transboundary pollution game
• Dynamic optimal control of transboundary pollution abatement under learning-by-doing depreciation
• The envelope theorem for locally differentiable Nash equilibria of discounted and autonomous infinite horizon differential games
• A dynamic bioeconomic analysis of mountain pine beetle epidemics
• Stable Markov perfect equilibria in the asymmetric differential-game duopoly with a renewable resource
• Fitted finite volume method of three transboundary pollution in Three Gorges Reservoir Area of Chongqing city with emission permits trading by cooperative stochastic differential game
• Negotiating environmental agreements: Regional or federal authority?
• A differential game of industrial pollution management considering public participation
• Numerical simulation for European and American option of risks in climate change of Three Gorges Reservoir Area
• Environmental federalism and environmental liability
• The externalities problem of transboundary and persistent pollution
• Transboundary emission under stochastic differential game
• A differential game of transboundary industrial pollution with emission permits trading

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