A differential game of industrial pollution management considering public participation

DOI10.1155/2020/6621331MaRDI QIDQ2228172zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Fulei Shi, Cuiyou Yao, Chuan-Sheng Wang

Publication date 16 February 2021

Published in Journal of Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1155/2020/6621331

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

Review text

Summary: In recent years, with the rapid development of economy, industrial pollution problems have become more and more serious. In this paper, a differential game model is proposed for industrial pollution management, in which public participation is taken into consideration. Then, a feedback Nash equilibrium (FBNE) solution is obtained among the government, enterprises, and the public. Finally, a numerical example is given to illustrate the results. The results show that the public participation will take a positive part in forcing enterprises to reduce emissions. Furthermore, with the increase of the probability of the public reporting the illegal discharge of pollutants by enterprises, the probability of enterprises' active emission reduction will also greatly increase.

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Cites work

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• A differential game of industrial pollution management
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Cited in

(3)

• A new evolutionary game analysis for industrial pollution management considering the central Government's punishment
• Application research on game analysis in environmental pollution group events
• Regular-impulse control for air pollution management: a stochastic differential game approach

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