A new evolutionary game analysis for industrial pollution management considering the central Government's punishment

DOI10.1007/s13235-021-00407-xzbMath1494.91111OpenAlexW3214847198MaRDI QIDQ2150672

Fulei Shi, Cuiyou Yao, Chuan-Sheng Wang

Publication date: 30 June 2022

Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-021-00407-x

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary gamepunishmentindustrial pollution

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Cites Work

• On the evolution of continuous types under replicator and gradient dynamics: two examples
• A differential game of industrial pollution management
• Competition, kin selection, and evolutionary stable strategies
• How moral codes evolve in a trust game
• New evolutionary game model of the regional governance of haze pollution in China
• Incomplete information, dynamic stability and the evolution of preferences: two examples
• The control of environmental pollution and optimal investment and employment decisions
• Evolutionary Games in Economics

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