Environmental federalism and environmental liability
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Recommendations
- ``It's all in the mix! -- Internalizing externalities with R\&D subsidies and environmental liability
- Extended liability for environmental accidents: what you see is what you get
- Transboundary pollution control in federal systems
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3943518
- A note on environmental federalism: Interpreting some contradictory results
Cites work
- A note on environmental federalism: Interpreting some contradictory results
- Direct regulation of a mobile polluting firm.
- Environmental Policy with Endogenous Plant Locations
- Harmonization and optimal environmental policy in a federal system with asymmetric information
- Locational Choices of Firms and Decentralized Environmental Policy with Various Instruments
- On interjurisdictional competition and environmental federalism
- Optimal institutional arrangements for transboundary pollutants in a second-best world: evidence from a differential game with asymmetric players
- Strict liability as a deterrent in toxic waste management: Empirical evidence from accident and spill data
- The choice of a liability regime when there is a regulatory gatekeeper
Cited in
(7)- A note on environmental federalism: Interpreting some contradictory results
- Transboundary pollution control in federal systems
- Extended liability for environmental accidents: what you see is what you get
- Transboundary spillovers and decentralization of environmental policies
- On interjurisdictional competition and environmental federalism
- The choice of a liability regime when there is a regulatory gatekeeper
- Liability sharing and the role of insurance for environmental accidents
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