Transboundary pollution control in federal systems
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Publication:1289660
DOI10.1006/JEEM.1997.1008zbMATH Open0921.90049OpenAlexW2013964819MaRDI QIDQ1289660FDOQ1289660
Authors: Emilson C. D. Silva, Arthur J. Caplan 
Publication date: 31 May 1999
Published in: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeem.1997.1008
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Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)
Cited In (11)
- Optimal control of acid rain in a federation with decentralized leadership and information
- Optimal tax policy under heterogeneous environmental preferences
- Environmental policy in majoritarian systems
- Model of transfer tax on transboundary water pollution in China's river basin
- From firm to global-level pollution control: the case of transboundary pollution
- Transboundary pollution externalities: think globally, act locally?
- Environmental federalism and environmental liability
- Transboundary spillovers and decentralization of environmental policies
- A dynamic theory of spatial externalities
- Decentralized fiscal federalism revisited: optimal income taxation and public goods under horizontal leadership
- Socioeconomic drivers of environmental pollution in China: a spatial econometric analysis
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