Optimal control of acid rain in a federation with decentralized leadership and information

DOI10.1006/JEEM.1999.1113MaRDI QIDQ1590751zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Yoko Nagase, Emilson C. D. Silva

Publication date 21 December 2000

Published in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1006/jeem.1999.1113

zbMATH Keywords

decentralized informationdecentralized leadershipenvironmental policiessubgame perfect equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

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