Decentralized fiscal federalism revisited: optimal income taxation and public goods under horizontal leadership

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2012.05.005zbMATH Open1254.91450OpenAlexW1982120191MaRDI QIDQ1925889FDOQ1925889

Authors: Thomas Aronsson, Lars Persson 

Publication date: 27 December 2012

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.econ.umu.se/DownloadAsset.action?contentId=183027&languageId=3&assetKey=ues839

Recommendations

• Vertical tax externalities and the composition of public spending in a federation
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zbMATH Keywords

redistributionpublic goodsoptimal taxationfiscal federalismdecentralized leadershiphorizontal leadership

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Public goods (91B18)

Cites Work

• Transboundary pollution control in federal systems
• Public Goods, Self-Selection and Optimal Income Taxation

Cited In (5)

• Optimal taxation and intergovernmental transfer in a dynamic model with multiple levels of government.
• Ad-valorem taxation and the balance of externalities in federations
• Ad valorem taxes and the fiscal gap in federations
• Fiscal centralization vs. decentralization on economic growth and welfare: an optimal-control approach
• Vertical tax externalities and the composition of public spending in a federation

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