Public Goods, Self-Selection and Optimal Income Taxation

DOI10.2307/2527177zbMath0800.90243OpenAlexW1992549038MaRDI QIDQ4272854

Robin Boadway, Michael Keen

Publication date: 2 January 1994

Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/273226/files/qed_wp_828.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Public goods (91B18)

Related Items (10)

Optimal Provision of Public Goods: A Synthesis* ⋮ Decentralized fiscal federalism revisited: optimal income taxation and public goods under horizontal leadership ⋮ Tax rules ⋮ When is efficiency separable from distribution in the provision of club goods? ⋮ Toward an efficiency rationale for the public provision of private goods ⋮ Optimum taxation of life annuities ⋮ Public Provision, Commodity Demand, and Hours of Work: An Empirical Analysis ⋮ Equity-efficiency implications of a European tax and transfer system ⋮ Habit formation and the Pareto-efficient provision of public goods ⋮ Public investment and income taxation: redistribution vs.productive performance

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