Tax rules

DOI10.1007/S00355-012-0675-1MaRDI QIDQ2453433zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Hans Gersbach, Volker Hahn, Stephan Imhof

Publication date 6 June 2014

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-012-0675-1

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18)

Recommendations

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2154263
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3026735
• Tax Enforcement Problems
• Simple Rules for the Optimal Taxation of International Capital Income
• Fiscal rules of income transformation
• Efficient taxation of income

Cites work

• A crash course in implementation theory
• Consistent Majority Rules over Compact Sets of Alternatives
• Distribution-neutral provision of public goods
• Public Goods, Self-Selection and Optimal Income Taxation
• The benefit and sacrifice principles of taxation: a synthesis

Cited in

(9)

• Fiscal constitutions
• Channeling the final say in politics: a simple mechanism
• Response times and tax compliance
• Households, markets and public choice
• Constitutional rules of exclusion in jurisdiction formation
• Tax Enforcement Problems
• Critical decisions and constitutional rules
• Optimal democratic mechanisms: should minorities propose first?
• Information sharing in democratic mechanisms

This page was built for publication: Tax rules

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2453433)