Tax Enforcement Problems
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Publication:4252841
DOI10.1111/1467-9442.00047zbMATH Open0949.91524OpenAlexW2117537611MaRDI QIDQ4252841FDOQ4252841
Authors: Francisco Marhuenda, Ignacio Ortuño-Ortín
Publication date: 28 November 2000
Published in: Scandinavian Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10016/4178
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- A General Characterization of Optimal Income Tax Enforcement
- The option value of tax delinquency: Theory
- A PROPERTY TAXATION MECHANISM WITH SELF-ASSESSMENT
- The difficulty of beating the Taxman
- Tax compliance with uncertain income: a stochastic control model
- Tax farming redux: experimental evidence on performance pay for tax collectors
- Response times and tax compliance
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