A crash course in implementation theory
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(96)- A characterization of social choice correspondences that implement the core of simple games
- Self-selective social choice functions
- Nash implementing social choice rules with restricted ranges
- Aggregation of expert opinions
- Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples
- Efficient and stable collective choices under gregarious preferences
- Reject and renegotiate: the Shapley value in multilateral bargaining
- Subgame perfect implementation: a full characterization
- Self-implementation of social choice correspondences in Nash equilibrium
- Constrained implementation
- Nash implementation in production economies with unequal skills: a characterization
- Tax rules
- Nash implementation without no-veto power
- Implementation in partial equilibrium
- Implementation of Jefferson-d'Hondt rule in the formation of a parliamentary committee
- Implementation without expected utility: ex-post verifiability
- The theory of implementation when the planner is a player
- Implementation of optimal schedules in outsourcing with identical suppliers
- A foundation for strategic agenda voting
- Epistemological implementation of social choice functions
- Social choice rules implemented in dominant strategies
- On the equivalence of coalitional and individual strategy-proofness properties
- Are incentives against economic justice?
- Implementation theory
- Treading a fine line: (im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals
- Privacy in implementation
- Nash implementation of competitive equilibria in the job-matching market
- On the limits of democracy
- A commitment folk theorem
- Stable coalition governments: the case of three political parties
- Let them cheat!
- The division problem with voluntary participation
- Condorcet completion methods that inhibit manipulation through exploiting knowledge of electorate preferences
- The weak core of simple games with ordinal preferences: Implementation in Nash equilibrium.
- Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization
- Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms
- Choosing and sharing
- Quota implementation of the maximum sustainable yield for age-structured fisheries
- Foundations of mechanism design: a tutorial. I. Key concepts and classical results
- Foundations of mechanism design: a tutorial. II. Advanced concepts and results
- Hardness results for multicast cost sharing.
- A solution to the two-person implementation problem
- Implementation in strong core by codes of rights
- Preference manipulations lead to the uniform rule
- Implementation in minimax regret equilibrium
- Self-implementation of social choice correspondences in strong equilibrium
- Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium
- Partial ex-post verifiability and unique implementation of social choice functions
- Do coalitions matter in designing institutions?
- Behavioral strong implementation
- Price suppression stimulation in a local market
- Robust equilibrium outcomes in sequential games under almost common certainty of payoffs
- Dominant strategy implementation in economic environments
- Virtual repeated implementation
- Implementation with renegotiation when preferences and feasible sets are state dependent
- Behavioral aspects of implementation theory
- Complexity and repeated implementation
- The renegotiation-proofness principle and costly renegotiation
- Nash implementation with partially honest individuals
- Fairness and implementability in allocation of indivisible objects with monetary compensations
- Mechanism design with multidimensional, continuous types and interdependent valuations
- Behavioral mechanism design: evidence from the modified first-price auctions
- Implementation via mechanisms with transfers
- Maskin monotonicity in economies with indivisible goods and money
- Strategic and structural uncertainty in robust implementation
- A characterization of optimal feasible tax mechanism
- Computational implementation
- Cost sharing in production economies
- Strong implementation with partially honest individuals
- On the subgame perfect implementability of voting rules
- Eliciting the socially optimal allocation from responsible agents
- Natural implementation with semi-responsible agents in pure exchange economies
- Evolutionary implementation in a public goods game
- Behavioral implementation under incomplete information
- A new monotonicity condition for tournament solutions
- Full implementation in backward induction
- Robust virtual implementation with almost complete information
- Preference domains and the monotonicity of Condorcet extensions
- Flexible majority rules in democracyville: a guided tour
- Unequivocal majority and Maskin-monotonicity
- Fair linking mechanisms for resource allocation with correlated player types
- On combining implementable social choice rules
- Hedonic coalition formation games with variable populations: core characterizations and (im)possibilities
- Irresolute mechanism design: a new path to possibility
- In the beginning there were \(n\) agents: founding and amending a constitution
- Mechanism design and communication networks
- Outcome-robust mechanisms for Nash implementation
- Fighting collusion: an implementation theory approach
- Rationalizable implementation of social choice functions: Complete characterization
- Sharing an increase of the rent fairly
- Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts
- Mechanism design in fair sequencing
- Recent Results on Implementation with Complete Information
- Proper scoring rules for general decision models
- Mixed Bayesian implementation in general environments
- Committee design with endogenous participation
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